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INTRODUCTION

The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (hereinafter the "Project")
originated in a 1977 treaty between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for the construction of a system of locks in the Danube River.1 The Hungarian
government suspended, and subsequently abandoned, the Project in 1989, alleging grave risks to Hungary's environment and
Budapest's water supply. 2 The Slovak Republic (hereinafter
"Slovakia"), which succeeded Czechoslovakia as a party to the
Project, 3 denied these allegations and undertook an alternative
project wholly on Slovak territory. This unilateral operation has
allegedly had, and will continue to have, significant detrimental
effects on Hungary's environment and access to the water of the
Danube River.4 Despite efforts at mediation by the Commission

* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1998. The author wishes
to thank her husband for his patience and support.
1. Treaty Between the Hungarian People's Republic and The
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977,
Hung.-Czech., 1109 U.N.T.S. 235 [hereinafter 1977 Treaty].
2. See I.C.J., Press Communiqu6, Sept. 25, 1997 (visited Oct. 27,
1997) <http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ihs/ihsframe.htm> [hereinafter
ICJ Communiqu6, Sept. 25,- 1997].
3. On January 1, 1993, the Slovak Republic became an independent state, and acceded to the 1977 Treaty between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
Gen. List No. 92, para. 123 (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997) (visited Oct. 27, 1997)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihsjudframel .htm>
[hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project- (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997)] (finding that the 1977 Treaty became binding upon Slovakia on January 1,
1993). For ease of reference, the term "Slovakia" will be used in place
of "Czechoslovakia" and the "Slovak Republic" with regard to the
dispute.
4. See ICJ Communiqu6, Sept. 25, 1997, supra note 2; see also dis-
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of the European Communities, Hungary and Slovakia were unable to resolve their differences, and in 1993 the dispute was submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. 5 The case was noted internationally as the first
environmental case to be decided by the ICJ, and therefore one
of the most important of the century.6 Accordingly, many envi-

ronmental organizations and scientists expected the ICJ to
render a decision that would set a new international standard
7
placing greater priority on the environment.
This Note analyzes the ICJ decision, rendered at The Hague
on September 25, 1997. Part I provides an overview of the 1977
Treaty signed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Part II analyzes
the ICJ's decision with respect to (1) whether the environmental
concerns expressed by Hungary created a "state of necessity"
under customary international law; (2) whether Slovakia was legally entitled to unilaterally plan and operate an alternative project; and (3) whether Hungary's notification of termination of
the 1977 Treaty was legal. Part III discusses possible means of ensuring better environmental protection of the Danube River in
light of the ICJ's decision.

cussion infra Part I.D.
5. Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of
Justice of the Differences Between Them Concerning the GabcikovoNagymaros Project, Apr. 7, 1993, Hung.-Slovk., 32 I.L.M. 1293.
6. Worldview Dams: Major Precedents Expected in European Case, AM.
POL. NETWORK, Sept. 24, 1997. The ICJ stressed that "[i]n no previous
case of the Court have environmental problems been so fully pleaded
and considered." I.C.J., Press Communique, Sept. 19, 1997 (visited Oct.
27, 1997) <http://wwW.icj-cij.org/Presscom/ipr9709rev.htm> [hereinafter I.C.J. Communiqu6, Sept. 19, 1997]. There have, however, been
other international environmental disputes which have been settled or
adjudicated in other tribunals. See, e.g., Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v.
Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957); Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.),
3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Commission of the River Oder, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, (Sept. 10).
7. See Mark Schapiro, Unquiet Flows the Danube, NATION, Mar. 10,
1997, at 11.
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I. THE GABCiKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT
A.

The Danube River

The Danube River is the second longest river in Europe, flowing along or across the borders of ten countries in its 2,860 kilometer (1,777 mile) course from the Black Forest to the Black
Sea.8 For 142 of its 2,860 kilometers, the Danube River forms the
boundary between Hungary and Slovakia. 9 The portion of the
Danube River which is at the heart of the dispute is an approximately 200 kilometer (124 mile) stretch between the respective
capital cities of Bratislava and Budapest.10
The Danube River is also one of the world's richest ecosystems, containing one of Europe's few groundwater aquifers, as
well as one of its last remaining flood-plain forests, and is home
to over 200 unique species of flora and fauna.11 Generally, riparian ecosystems are more biologically diverse than their surrounding land, and provide corridors for wildlife. 12 A healthy riparian ecosystem also fulfills many seemingly unrelated
functions, including evening out the flow of water between wet
and dry seasons, retaining sediments, providing water storage,
maintaining the quality of the water, and transporting organic
matter downstream to form the basis of the food chain. 3 Therefore, the continued viability of the Danube River as a healthy
ecosystem is critical not only to environmentalists but also to the
riparian states along the Danube River.
Throughout European history, the Danube River has played a
vital role in the commercial and economic development of its ri-

8. Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Susan Murcott, The Danube River
Basin: International Cooperation or Sustainable Development, 36 NAT. REsoURCES J. 521, 521-24 (1996).

9. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 16.
10. Id.
11. Bela Liptak, Saving the Blue Danube, BUDAPEST SUN, Nov. 21,
1996, available in 1996 WL 13516001; see also Linnerooth-Bayer &
Murcott, supra note 8, at 524-25 (discussing the unique ecosystem of
the Danube River and its surrounding wetlands).
12. Ludwik A. Teclaff & Eileen Teclaff, Restoring River and Lake Basin Ecosystems, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 905, 906-07 (1994).
13. Id. at 906.
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parian states, and has been the focus of countless multilateral
and bilateral agreements for navigational use, as well as for the
production of hydroelectric power. 14 The cumulative environmental effects on the Danube River and its surrounding ecology from
such human activities have been far from favorable. 5 The transboundary nature of these effects has forced states to acknowledge their responsibility to other states for the environmental im6
pacts of their agreements and activities.'
B.

Treaty on the Construction and Operation of the GabczkovoNagymaros Project

The 1977 Treaty came into force on June 30, 1978, following
the exchange of instruments of ratification.1 7 According to its
Preamble, the objective of the Project was to achieve a "broad
utilization of the natural resources of the Bratislava-Budapest section of the Danube river for the development of water resources,
energy, transport, agriculture and other sectors of the national
economy of the Contracting Parties . .1.8."'
Article 1, section 1 of the 1977 Treaty provides that Hungary
and Czechoslovakia were to build, as a joint investment, two systems of locks which together would constitute "a single and indi-

14. See, e.g., Danube Fisheries Agreement, Jan. 29, 1958, 339
U.N.T.S. 23; Convention Concerning the Regime of Navigation on the
Danube, Aug. 18, 1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 181 [hereinafter Belgrade Convention]; Arrangement and Final Protocol Relative to the Exercise of the
Powers of the European Commission of the Danube, Aug. 18, 1938, 196
L.N.T.S. 113; Regulations of Navigation and Police Applicable to the
Danube Between Galatz and the Mouths, May 19, 1881, 158 Consol.
T.S. 245; Public Act of the European Commission of the Danube Relative to the Navigation of the Mouths of the Danube, Nov. 2, 1865, 131
Consol. T.S. 399.
15. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 17.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. Article 28, section 2 of the 1977 Treaty provides that "[t]he
Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification." 1977 Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28, § 2, 1109
U.N.T.S. at 248.
18. Id. pmbl., at 236.
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visible operational system of works."' 19 The first system of locks
was to be built around Gabcikovo, Slovakia, consisting of, inter
alia: (a) the Dunakiliti-Hrusov reservoir in Hungarian and Slovak
territory; (b) a dam at Dunakiliti in Hungarian territory; (c) a
bypass canal in Slovak territory; (d) a series of locks on the bypass canal (the Gabcikovo system of locks); (e) improvements to
the bed of the Danube River in the joint Hungarian-Slovak section; and (f) the deepening of the bed of the Danube River in
the joint Hungarian-Slovak section. 20 The second system of locks
was to be built around Nagymaros, Hungary, consisting of, inter
alia: (a) a reinforcement of flood-control works on the Danube
River in Hungarian and Slovak territories; (b) a series of locks in
Hungarian territory (the Nagymaros system of locks) with a hydroelectric power plant; and (c) the deepening of the bed of the
Danube River in Hungarian territory.21 In essence, Hungary and
Slovakia sought to invest jointly in a project for the production
of hydroelectricity, the improvement of navigation on the portion of the Danube River bordering the two states, and the protection from flooding of the areas along the banks of that portion of the Danube River.
Concurrently, Hungary and Slovakia undertook to ensure that
the quality of water, the bed of the Danube River, and the surrounding natural environment were not impaired as a result of
22
the Project.

19. Id. art. 1, § 1.
20. See id.art. 1, § 2, at 236-37.
21. See id.art. 1, § 3, at 237.
22. Article 15, section 1 of the 1977 Treaty provides that "[t]he
Contracting Parties shall ensure, by the means specified in the joint
contractual plan, that the quality of the water in the Danube is not impaired as a result of the construction and operation of the System of
Locks." Id. at 244. Article 16 provides that the "[m]aintenance of the
bed of the Danube . ..shall be incumbent upon . ..the Contracting

Parties." Id. Article 19 provides that "It]he Contracting Parties shall,
through the means specified in the joint contractual plan, ensure compliance with the obligations for the protection of nature arising in connection with the construction and operation of the System of Locks."
Id.at 245.
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Hungary's Suspension and Abandonment of Construction Under
the Project

After intense criticism from the public and from scientists
within Hungary and internationally, the Hungarian government
decided, on May 13, 1989, to suspend construction at Nagymaros
pending the completion of various studies of the environmental
effects of the system of locks.2 3 The studies were to be completed
by July 31, 1989.24 On July 21, 1989, the Hungarian government
extended the suspension of construction at Nagymaros, and also
suspended construction at Dunakiliti, until October 31, 1989.25
On October 27, 1989, the Hungarian government abandoned
construction of the Nagymaros system of locks, and extended the
26
suspension of construction at Dunakiliti.
In support of its abandonment of construction under the Project, Hungary stated that the two governments had chosen the
system of locks only because it was more economical than its alternatives.2 7 The Hungarian government contended that construction of the system of locks would inflict unjustifiable environmental harm on the ecology of the Danube River and its
surrounding wetlands, in six principal ways.
First, construction of the locks at Gabcikovo and Dunakiliti, in
accordance with the Project, would produce a residual discharge
of 50 to 200 cubic meters per second (m/s) of water into the old
bed of the Danube River. Consequently, the groundwater level
would fall in the Danube River, requiring Budapest to obtain

23. The Project "was the object . . . of increasing apprehension,
both within a section of public opinion and in some scientific circles
. . . as to the guarantees it offered for preservation of the environment, engender[ing] a climate of growing concern and opposition with
regard to the Project." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25,
1997), supra note 3, para. 32.
24. See id. para. 33.
25. See id. para. 36.
26. See id. para. 22.
27. See id. para. 40. The Soviet Union also reportedly exerted a
great deal of pressure on both governments. See Paul R. Williams, Can
International Legal Principles Play a Positive Role in Resolving Central and
East European TransboundaryEnvironmentalDisputes?, 7 GEO. INT'L ENvTL.
L. REv. 421, 443 n.85 (1995); Slovaks Finish Much-Criticized Dam on Danube, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 3, 1992, at A8.
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water from the stagnant and silted-up reservoir at Dunakiliti and
the side-arms. 28 The Hungarian government believed this would
seriously impair the quality of water in Hungary in the long
term.2 9 Second, the residual discharge into the old bed would
also increase the risk of eutrophication3 ° of surface water, particularly in the reservoir of the Danube River.3' The old bed of the
Danube River would be choked with alga, reducing the flow of
water to a mere trickle. 32 Third, the decrease in the groundwater
level could cause the Danube River to be choked with sand, resulting in the network of side-arms to be cut off from the principal bed. 33 The side-arms would then dry up, causing mass extinction of the fluvial flora and fauna therein. 34 Fourth, the
significant daily variation in water level resulting from the operation of the Gabcikovo power plant would threaten aquatic
3
habitats. 1
Fifth, Hungary was also concerned that the construction of
locks at Nagymaros would silt-up the bed of the Danube River
upstream of Nagymaros, impairing the quality of water in the
bank-filtered wells.36 Sixth, Hungary feared that construction of
the Nagymaros dam would erode the riverbed downstream of
Nagymaros. 37 This would cause the water level to fall in that sec-

28. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 40.
29. See id.
30. Eutrophication refers to the process through which a body of
fresh water is transformed into marsh. As aquatic organisms consume
the oxygen and nutrients in the water, silt and organic debris accumulate, causing the water to become warmer and shallower. Eventually, organisms that thrive in warmer water dominate the ecosystem and marsh
plants fill in the basin. Sewage emissions and other waste streams may
greatly accelerate this process. See COLUM. ENCYCLOPEDIA 905-06 (5th ed.
1993).
31. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 40.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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tor, which provides two-thirds of Budapest's water supply.38 There
was also concern that any water that was supplied would be diminished in quality as a result of increases in fine sediments
which would strain the filtration of the water supply.3 9
Not surprisingly, Slovakia has continually disputed any scientific evidence suggesting that the system of locks would cause deleterious effects on the ecology of the Danube River or its surrounding wetlands. Slovakia contends that Hungary is either
using the environment as an excuse to back out of a project
which it can no longer afford or that it wishes to avoid for political reasons. 40 Scientists in Slovakia have asserted that "notwithstanding the fervent continual attacks waged against this project
at high international forums by Hungary's political leadership
and despite catastrophic predictions, these water projects on the
'41
Danube have invaluable environmental benefits.
Specifically, Slovakia claims three principal benefits from the
Project. 42 First, the reservoir was planned so that the water level
would be elevated by several meters at a site where the Danube
River enters the Zitny Ostrov subsoil. This was expected to make
the ground water regimen at the site considerably more dynamic
and to contribute to the dilution and cleansing of contamination
in the water caused by farming in the surrounding areas. 43 Sec-

38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See OLGA VAVROVA, GABCiKOVO 24 (Narodna Obroda 1993).
Vladimir Holcik, the general manager of the Research Institute of
Water Systems in Bratislava, Slovakia, which claims to have conducted
extensive research since 1951 on the potential environmental impact of
the Project, stated that "the waterworks of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros represents not the problem of environment but exclusively that of geopolicy." Id. at 14.
41. VOJTECH HRASKO, THE GABCiKOVO PROJECT - SAVING THE DANUBE'S INLAND DELTA 16 (1993).
42. See id. at 20.
43. Recent studies have shown that "it is agricultural activities that
cause approximately half of [Czechoslovakia's] water pollution
problems through the use of high nitrate concentrations and other
chemicals, and the improper disposal of liquid animal manure." FW.
Carter, Czechoslovakia, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE
63, 69 (EW.
Carter & David Turnock eds., 1996).
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ond, an increase in the water level at the reservoir site would
have increased the volume of water filtered through the subsoil,
which could be processed for drinking, water supply and irrigation." Third, elevation of the water level in the reservoir would
provide a continuous water supply to the side-arms of the Danube River throughout the year, including periods when they have
traditionally been partially or completely dry. This, it is claimed,
would "create conditions for the revitalization and lasting conservation of the Danube's delta as well as diversifying [the] region's
45
flora and fauna."
Slovakia has also argued that ecological damage would be
greater if the Project were discontinued now, because of
46
problems concerning the proper disposal of concrete materials.
Additionally damaging, Slovakia contends, is removal of sand
from other areas in order to fill the large areas of land that have
been dug up in preparation for construction in Gabcikovo,
Dunakiliti and Nagymaros. 4 7 Alternatively, Slovakia claims that
negative ecological effects, if any, associated with the destruction
of agricultural land and the clearing of forests are irreversible at
48
this point.
The extent of environmental harm threatened by construction
of the system of works will never be fully known inasmuch as
Hungary has never completed, nor is it likely to complete, construction of the system of locks at Dunakiliti and Nagymaros.
The ICJ was therefore faced with the difficult task of weighing
the rights of the parties under treaty law, as well as being "mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and
prevention are required on account of the often irreversible
character of damage to the environment ....

44. See HRASKO, supra note 41, at 20.

45. Id.
46. See VAVROVA, supra note 40, at 22.

47. See id.
48. Id. This problematic attitude indicates what one scholar has
described as a need for "greater awareness of [environmental]
problems both by officials and the general population" in Slovakia.
Carter, supra note 43, at 88.
49. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 140.
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Slovakia's UnilateralDiversion of the Danube River

In September of 1990, a year after Hungary abandoned the
Project, Slovakia informed Hungary that it was considering seven
different hypothetical alternative solutions to the construction of
the system of works.5 0 All of the alternative solutions contemplated an agreement between Slovakia and Hungary, with the exception of one, subsequently known as Variant C, which Slovakia
intended to carry out without Hungary's agreement or cooperation.5 1 On July 23, 1991, Slovakia adopted Variant C, construction
for which was begun in November of 1991.52
Variant C involved the unilateral diversion of the Danube
River on Slovak territory at a point ten kilometers upstream of
Dunakiliti5 3 In its final form, Variant C included the construction of an overflow dam at Cunovo, where both banks of the
Danube River are on Slovak territory, and a levee linking that
dam to the south bank of the bypass canal.5 4 The filling of the
Cunovo dam rapidly caused a major reduction in the flow and
level of downstream waters in the old bed and side-arms of the
Danube River.5 5 Hungary claimed that Slovakia's operation of the
works under Variant C not only violated the 1977 Treaty, but also
infringed on Hungary's territorial sovereignty and integrity, and
violated customary international law regarding shared interna56
tional watercourses.

II.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION

The dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over Hungary's
abandonment of the Project, as well as Slovakia's unilateral diversion of the Danube River under Variant C, led the Commission
of the European Communities to offer to mediate their differences. 57 Mediation was held in London on October 28, 1992, dur-

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
3, para.

Id. para. 61.
Id.
Id. para. 23.
Id.
Id.
See id. para. 25.
Id. para. 64; see discussion infta Part II.B.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
24.
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ing which the governments of Hungary and Slovakia were able to
agree on only two matters: (1) to submit their dispute to the ICJ,
and (2) to create a tripartite group of experts to conduct a factfinding mission regarding the effects of Variant C and submit
suggestions for emergency measures regarding the Project.5 8 On
December 1, 1993, the experts recommended various temporary
remedial measures which were incorporated in an agreement
which was to terminate fourteen days after the ICJ rendered its
judgment.5 9
On April 7, 1993, Hungary and Slovakia signed and forwarded
an agreement to submit their dispute to the ICJ for adjudication.6° Three questions were submitted for resolution by the ICJ:
(1) whether Hungary was entitled to suspend and subsequently
abandon the works on the Project; (2) whether Slovakia was entitled to proceed with a provisional solution for damming up the
Danube River on Slovak territory; and (3) the legal effects of
Hungary's notification, on May 19, 1992, to terminate the 1977
Treaty. 61 The ICJ was "also requested to determine the legal consequences, including the rights and obligations of the Parties,
arising from its Judgment" on these three questions. 62 The panel
was composed of the ICJ's fifteen judges under the Presidency of

58. Id. The tripartite group of experts was to be made up of one
expert designated by each party and three independent experts designated by the Commission of the European Communities. See id. para.
25.
59. The remedial measures adopted by Hungary and Slovakia in
the Agreement Concerning Certain Temporary Technical Measures and
Discharges in the Danube and Mosoni branch of the Danube, Apr. 19,
1995, Hung.-Slovk., cited in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept.
25, 1997), supra note 3, para. 25, raised the discharge of water into the
Mosoni branch of the Danube River and provided for Hungary's construction of a partially-submerged weir near Dunakiliti for the purpose
of improving the water supply to the side-arms of the Danube River located within Hungarian territory. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note 3, para. 25.
60. Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court
of Justice of the Differences Between the Republic of Hungary and the
Slovak Republic Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Apr. 7,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1293 (1993).
61. See id. art. 2, § 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1295.
62. Id. art. 2, § 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1295.
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Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel.63
A.

Hungary's UnilateralSuspension and Abandonment of the Project

In defense of its abandonment of the Project, Hungary asserted that the potential environmental harm to the ecology of
the Danube River and its surrounding wetlands, as well as the
threat to Hungary's water supply, created a "state of ecological
necessity" in 1989. 64
Slovakia's rebuttal was twofold. First, it argued that "ecological
necessity" or "ecological risk" did not fall within the "state of necessity" exception. 65 Therefore, environmental considerations did
not ameliorate the wrongfulness of an act under customary international law. 66 Second, even if ecological necessity could fall
within the "state of necessity" exception, Slovakia denied that
any "state of ecological necessity" existed in 1989 or at any time
thereafter. 67 Slovakia argued that Hungary gave an "exaggeratedly
pessimistic description of the situation." 68 At the same time, however, Slovakia did not deny that ecological problems could have
arisen, although it did assert that they could, to a large extent,
have been remedied through modifications and amendments to
69
the 1977 Treaty.

63. I.C.J., Press Communiqu6, Feb. 17, 1997 (visited Mar. 25, 1998)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/Presscom/ipr9704.htm>.
64. See discussion supra Part I.C.
65. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 44.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text regarding
Slovakia's views that the Project benefited the ecology of the Danube
River and its surrounding areas.
68. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 44.
69. See id. Both Hungary and Slovakia presented a tremendous
amount of scientific evidence in support of their respective arguments
regarding the environmental consequences of the construction of the
system of locks at Gabcikovo and Nagymaros. At the requests of both
parties, the judges took the unprecedented measure of actually visiting
the affected areas in Hungary and Slovakia. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). The visit was made between April 1, 1997 and April 4, 1997. Accompanied by agents and
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The "state of necessity" exception is a ground recognized
under customary international law for precluding wrongful conduct which is not in conformity with an international obligation. 70 A "state of necessity" has been defined as "the situation of
a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest
threatened by a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct
not in conformity with what is required of it by an international
obligation to another State." 71 Under article 33 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a "state of necessity" exception may
not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding the violation of the state's international obligation to another state unless
"the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest
of the State against a grave and imminent peril" and "the act did
not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards
which the obligation existed."7 2 Moreover, because the exception
should only be applied under exceptional circumstances, 73 it may
not be invoked if any of the following three conditions apply: (1)
the international obligation of the state, with which its acts are

technical advisors for both Hungary and Slovakia, the judges were
shown a number of locations in the Danube River area between Bratislava, Slovakia, and Budapest, Hungary. The judges were able to put
questions of fact to the two delegations during the visit. See I.C.J., Press
Communique, Apr. 9, 1997 (visited Mar. 25, 1998) <http://www.icjcij.org/Presscom/ipr9707.htm>.
70. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 50. Customary international law is evidenced by the general practice of states accepting it as law. Evidence of customary international law may also be found in the writings of international lawyers,
in judgments of international tribunals and in treaties. See MICHAEL
AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 33-34 (1987).
71. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility art. 33 cmt. 1, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work
of Its Thirty-Second Session, [1980] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMMISSION 30, 34, U.N.

Doc. A/35/10 [hereinafter ILC, Draft Articles].
72. Id. art. 33, § 1, at 34.
73. The International Law Commission explicitly stated that the
exception was "even more rarely admissible than . . . other circumstances precluding wrongfulness . . . ." Id. art. 33 cmts. 19, 40 (citing

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 62, U.N.
Doc. A/CONE39/27, 1980 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 7964) [hereinafter Law of Treaties]).
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not in conformity, arises out of a peremptory norm of general
international law; (2) the international obligation of the state,
with which its acts are not in conformity, is stipulated by a treaty
that, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of invoking
the "state of necessity" exception with respect to that obligation;
or (3) the state in question has contributed to the occurrence of
74
the "state of necessity.

For the "state of necessity" exception to apply with respect to
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, seven factors would therefore
have to be established by Hungary:
(1) The environmental concerns constituted an "essential interest" of Hungary;
(2) Hungary's environmental concerns were threatened by
"grave and imminent peril" in 1989;
(3) Suspension and abandonment of the construction of works
at Nagymaros and Dunakiliti were the only means by which Hungary could have safeguarded its environmental concerns;
(4) Hungary's suspension and abandonment of the construction of works at Nagymaros and Dunakiliti did not impair an essential interest of Slovakia;
(5) Hungary's obligations under the 1977 Treaty did not arise
out of a peremptory norm of general international law;
(6) The 1977 Treaty did not, either explicitly or implicitly, exclude the possibility of invoking the "state of necessity" exception with respect to Hungary's obligations under the 1977 Treaty;
and
(7) Hungary had not contributed to the occurrence of the
"state of necessity."
There was no question that Hungary's environmental concerns
constituted an "essential interest" within the meaning of the
Draft Articles. 75 The International Law Commission envisioned
that an "essential interest" not be limited to matters relating to
the existence of the state, and in fact explicitly recognized that
"safeguarding the ecological balance has come to be considered

74. Id. art. 33, § 2, at 34.
75. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 53.
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an 'essential interest' of all States." 76
The fifteen judges of the ICJ found it very difficult, however,
to conclude that Hungary's environmental concerns were
threatened by "grave and imminent peril." 77 The existence of a
"peril" is measured by an objective standard, and envisages a risk
that exists at the relevant point in'time. 78 The mere apprehension of a possible peril is not sufficient to meet this standard, as
it must be simultaneously "grave" and "imminent." 79 On the
other hand, a future peril may still be considered "imminent" if
the knowledge and realization of future peril is imminent, and
80
such future peril is certain and inevitable.
The ICJ noted that the dangers Hungary ascribed to the upstream reservoir following construction of the works at
Nagymaros were mostly of a long-term nature and, more importantly, uncertain.8 ' Also, Hungary's concern over environmental
harm to the flora and fauna from operation of the Gabcikovo
power plant had, in the ICJ's opinion, "already materialized to a
large extent for a number of years, so that it could not, in 1989,
represent a peril arising entirely out of the project."8 2 Therefore,
the judges concluded, Hungary had failed to prove that the
threat to the environment was either "grave" or "imminent"
when Hungary suspended and abandoned its obligation to continue construction of the system of locks in 1989.83
The ICJ also disagreed with Hungary's contention that suspension and abandonment of construction of the system of locks at
Nagymaros and Dunakiliti were the only means by which Hun-

ILC, Draft Articles, supra note 71, art. 33 cmt. 14, at 39.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.Cj. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
54.
Id.; see also Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Develof
International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45, 69 (1991)
opment
[hereinafter Teclaff, Fiat or Custom].
79. Id.; see also ILC, Draft Articles, supra note 71, art. 33, § 1(a) &
cmt. 3, at 34-35.
80. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 54.
81. See discussion supra Part I.C.
82. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 55.
83. Id. para. 57.
76.
77.
3, para.
78.
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gary could have safeguarded its environmental concerns.8 4 The
judges noted that any dangers to the environment in the areas
upstream and downstream of Gabcikovo and Nagymaros were
linked closely to whether Hungary and Slovakia chose to operate
the Gabcikovo power plant in peak mode.8 5 In the court's opinion, Hungary could have negotiated with Slovakia to operate the
Gabcikovo power plant at a level lower than peak mode to limit
environmental harm.8 6 As for environmental concerns downstream of Nagymaros, Hungary and Slovakia could have regularly
discharged gravel into the river to prevent erosion of the river
bed.87
The ICJ held that it had "no need to consider whether Hungary . . . 'seriously impair[ed] an essential interest' of
[Slovakia],"88 because Hungary had failed to prove a threat of
"grave and imminent peril" to support its claim under the "state
of necessity" exception. 89 Nor did the judges address the fifth
and sixth criteria for establishing a "state of necessity" exception:
whether Hungary's obligations under the 1977 Treaty arose out
of a peremptory norm of general international law, 90 and
whether the 1977 Treaty, either explicitly or implicitly, excludes
the possibility of invoking the "state of necessity" exception with
respect to Hungary's obligations thereunder.
The ICJ briefly addressed the seventh criterion which Hungary
would have needed to satisfy under the "state of necessity" exception: that Hungary had not contributed to the occurrence of
the "state of necessity." The judges noted that both Hungary and

84. Id.
85. Id. para. 55.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. para. 58.
89. Id.
90. A peremptory norm of international law, also known as jus
cogens, "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Law of Treaties,
supra note 73, art. 53; see also AKEHURST, supra note 70, at 40-42; GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 582-84 (Bruce Nichols ed., 1992).
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Slovakia had undertaken numerous scientific and technical studies before 1977, and that, therefore, Hungary was aware of the
"situation as then known, when it assumed its obligations under
the [1977] Treaty." 9' Hungary asserted that "the environmental,
ecological and water quality impacts were not taken into account
properly during the design and construction period, ' 92 and that
any studies that had been conducted were therefore inadequate. 93 However, the ICJ held that Hungary had indeed helped,
by act or omission, to bring about the "state of necessity" such as
it was by its recognition in articles 15, 19, and 20 of the 1977
Treaty of the need to ensure the protection of the
94
environment.
In sum, as to the first question presented by Hungary and
Slovakia, the ICJ found that the "state of necessity" exception
did not apply and that, therefore, "Hungary was not entitled to
suspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989, the works on the
Nagymaros Project and on the part of the Gabcikovo Project for
which the 1977 Treaty and related instruments attributed responsibility to it." 9s

B.

Slovakia's UnilateralDiversion of the Danube River
96
In defending its unilateral adoption of Variant C, Slovakia
claimed that this recourse was rendered inevitable for economic,
ecological, and navigational reasons, because of Hungary's suspension and abandonment of the Project. 97 Applying the "principle of approximate application," Slovakia argued that, under the
circumstances, Variant C represented the closest solution to the
Project's original objective and the only possibility remaining to
Slovakia "of fulfilling not only the purposes of the 1977 Treaty,

91. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note
3, para. 57.
92. Id. para. 56 (citing June 23, 1989 report by ad hoc Committee
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (emphasis added).
93. See id.

94. See id. para. 57.
95. Id. para. 59.
96. At this time, the argument was made by Czechoslovakia,
Slovakia's predecessor in interest. See supra note 3.
97. See id. para. 68; see also supra Part I.D.
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but the continuing obligation to implement [the 1977 Treaty] in
98
good faith."
Slovakia further claimed that it was not only entitled, but even
obligated under international law to implement Variant C. 99
Damages would have been tremendous in the dispute, not only
because of the large national expenditures made in the preparation and partial construction of the system of locks, but also because of "the additional economic and environmental prejudice
which would have resulted from the failure to complete the
works at Dunakiliti/Gabcikovo and to put the system into operation."' 0 Therefore, Slovakia argued, it had an obligation under
international law to mitigate such damages by implementing Variant C.10 '
Hungary rebutted by arguing that Slovakia's unilateral diversion and regulation of the Danube River were: (1) an infringement of Hungary's territorial sovereignty and integrity under international law because it diverted the natural course of the
Danube River; 0 2 (2) a violation of the principle of customary international law governing the utilization of shared international
resources; 0 3 (3) a violation of the 1977 Treaty;' °4 (4) a violation

98. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 67.
99. See id. para. 68.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id. para. 64. But see Teclaff, Fiat or Custom, supra note 78, at
69 (discussing 1952 memorandum by the UN Econ. Comm'n for Europe suggesting that full exercise of sovereign power of states over waterways within their borders would unduly limit the rights of other riparian states).
103. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 64. In 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated, in reference to navigation on the River Oder, that the "community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all
riparian States in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the other." Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27 (Sept. 10);
see also Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (laying down princi-
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of the 1976 Border Waters Agreement;10 5 and (5) a violation of
the spirit of the 1948 Danube River Convention.10 6 Moreover,
Hungary argued, mitigation of damages relates solely to the
quantification of loss, and could not serve to excuse conduct
07
which is otherwise substantively unlawful.
In regard to Slovakia's primary contention, the ICJ declined to
address whether there is a principle of international law or a
general principle of law of "approximate application" because, in
its opinion, "even if such a principle existed, it could by definition only be employed within the limits of the treaty in question
... [and] Variant C does not meet that cardinal condition with
regard to the 1977 Treaty." 108 The ICJ stressed that, by definition,

ples for the utilization of shared water resources).
104. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 64; see also supra Part I.D.
105. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 64; see also Williams, supra note 27, at 441 & n.75 (discussing 1976 Bilateral Agreement Regarding the Management of Water
Supplies of Border Waters, Czech.-Hung. Article 3, paragraph 1 of the
Border Waters, Agreement provides that the two states will not "take
any action in the management of water-supplies that would unfavourably interfere with the mutually determined conditions of the
water" without their mutual consent, and that they will "use . . .riverbeds . .. in such a manner that they do not cause damages to each
other.").
106. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 64; see also Belgrade Convention, supra note 14. The Belgrade Convention requires states to "undertake to maintain their sections of the Danube in a navigable condition .. .and to carry out the
works necessary for the maintenance and improvement of navigation
conditions," in consultation with the Danube Commission. Id. art. 3, 33
U.N.T.S. at 199.
107. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.Cj. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 71.
108. Id. para. 76. The principle of approximate application has
been described as a sound principle of law that whenever a legal instrument of continuing validity cannot be applied literally, owing to the
conduct of one of the parties, it must, without allowing that party to
take advantage of its own conduct, be applied in a way approximating
most closely its primary objective. See Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 I.CJ. 23, 46 (June
1) (separate opinion of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht), quoted in Gabcikovo-
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a "joint investment... constituting a single and indivisible operational system of works" cannot be carried out by one party's
unilateral action."09
Moreover, despite the fact that the Danube River is a shared
international watercourse, not to mention an international
boundary river, operation of Variant C involved the appropriation of eighty to ninety percent of the water from the Danube
River for the sole use and benefit of Slovakia before being returned to the main bed of the river.110 Although Hungary had
undoubtedly agreed to the diversion of water into the bypass canal when it concluded the 1977 Treaty, such agreement was only
in the context of a joint operation and benefit.1 ' Therefore, the
ICJ held, Hungary could not have forfeited its right to an equitable sharing of the resources of the Danube River. 12 The ICJ accordingly concluded that Slovakia's unilateral operation of Variant C was a violation of express provisions of the 1977 Treaty. 1 3
The judges also concurred with Hungary's argument that the
duty to mitigate damages provides a basis for the calculation of
damages, but could not justify an otherwise wrongful act." 4
The remaining consideration regarding Slovakia's unilateral action was whether Variant C was a justifiable countermeasure to
Hungary's illegal act, thereby precluding Slovakia's wrongful act.
As such, Slovakia's countermeasure would have to meet four basic conditions. 1 5 First, its action must have been taken in response to a prior international wrongful act by Hungary, and
must have been directed against Hungary." 6 The adoption of Va-

Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note 3, para. 75.
109. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 77 (quoting 1977 Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1, § 1, 1109
U.N.T.S. at 236).
110. See id. para. 78.
Ill. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. para. 79.
115. See International Law Commission, Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 144-45, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
116. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 83.
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riant C had indeed been taken in response to Hungary's prior
unlawful suspension and abandonment of the Project and had
been directed against Hungary. 17 Second, Slovakia must have
told Hungary to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make
reparations.11 8 Slovakia had on several occasions requested Hungary to continue construction of the system of works. 19 Third,
the effects of the countermeasure must be commensurate with
the injury suffered by Slovakia. 120 The ICJ found that deprivation
of Hungary's right to an equitable share of the natural resources
of the Danube River constituted a failure to respect the proportionality required of Slovakia under international law, and therefore was not commensurate with Slovakia's injury.'2 1 Fourth, the
purpose of Slovakia's countermeasure must have been to induce
Hungary to comply with its obligations under international law,
and must be reversible. 22 It is debatable whether the purpose of
Slovakia's unilateral diversion of the Danube River under Variant
C was to induce Hungary to comply with its obligation to continue construction of the system of works. It is equally, if not
more, plausible that Slovakia had found it to be in its own economic interest to make use of what had already been constructed and to satisfy its need for hydroelectricity.
In summary, the ICJ concluded that while Slovakia was entitled
to unilaterally plan and construct its alternative solution to the
Project, it did not have the right to put that alternative solution
into operation, because it violated the express purpose of the
117. See supra Part II.A (with respect to the ICJ's holding that Hungary's suspension of construction under the Project was a violation of
international law).
118. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 84.
119. See id. paras. 61-64.
120. See id. para. 85.
121. See id. Under international law, a State's response to a breach
by another state must be in some sense proportionate to the breach in
both magnitude and kind. See John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a
Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release
and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83
VA_ L. REv. 1, 8 (1997).
122. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 87.

358

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

1977 Treaty, as well as Hungary's territorial integrity and sovereign independence. 2 3 Moreover, Slovakia's operation of the alternative solution did not constitute a lawful countermeasure
under international law, because the deprivation of Hungary's
right to an equitable share of the use of the Danube River was in
124
excess of the injury suffered by Slovakia.
C.

Hungary's Notification of Termination of the 1977 Treaty

On May 16, 1992, Hungary submitted a formal declaration terminating the Project, 25 claiming that the immediate cause for
termination was Slovakia's continued refusal to suspend its construction on Variant C pending negotiations and mediation efforts by the Commission of the European Communities. 126 Hungary further stated that it could not accept the deleterious effects
on the environment accompanying the implementation of Variant C, which would be equivalent to the environmental dangers
under the original Project. 27 The ICJ considered each of the five
arguments raised by Hungary as alternative or concurrent bases
under the Law of Tieaties 128 for the legality of their notification
of termination of the 1977 Treaty: 2 9 (1) the existence of a State

123. See id. para. 88.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Hungary
on the Termination of the Treaty Concluded Between the People's Republic of Hungary and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia on the
Construction and Joint Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage
System, May 16, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1247, 1260.
126. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 91.
127. Id. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text with respect
to Hungary's allegations of environmental harm under the original
project.
128. Law of Treaties, supra note 73.
129. Before addressing whether Hungary's notification of termination was legally effective, the ICJ found that the Law of Treaties was not
directly applicable to the 1977 Treaty inasmuch as the 1977 Treaty was
concluded before the Law of Treaties entered into force. See
Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note 3, para.
99. Article 4 of the Law of Treaties provides that it "applies only to
treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into force of the
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of Necessity; (2) impossibility of performance of the 1977 Treaty;
(3) the occurrence of a fundamental change of circumstances;
(4) material breach of the 1977 Treaty by Slovakia; and (5) the
development of new norms of international environmental law. 130
1. The Existence of a State of Necessity
Hungary contended that Slovakia's continued inflexibility regarding suspension of construction under Variant C during negotiations converted a temporary state of necessity into a permanent state of necessity.' 3' The ICJ, having found that no "state of
necessity" existed with respect to Hungary's environmental con132
cerns, negated this first ground for legality of termination.
Moreover, it found that even if a "state of necessity" had existed,
it would not be a ground for termination of a treaty because a
"state of necessity" merely suspends a treaty until the "state of
necessity" disappears, but does not otherwise terminate a
treaty. 133 The treaty can only be terminated by the mutual agreement of the parties, or by the fulfillment of all conditions for termination stipulated in the treaty itself 134 or in the Law of

present Convention with regard to such States." Law of Treaties, supra
note 73, art. 4. However, rules in the Law of Treaties which codify customary international law are applicable to the 1977 Treaty. Specifically,
the ICJ found that articles 60 through 62 of the Law of Treaties, which
relate to termination or suspension of a treaty, are declaratory of customary international law. Because the 1977 Treaty does not provide for
termination of the 1977 Treaty and Hungary and Slovakia have not
agreed otherwise, the principles enumerated in the Law of Treaties
provide the best grounds for termination of the 1977 Treaty. See
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note 3, para.
100.
130. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 92.
131. See id. para. 93.
132. See id. para. 101; see discussion supra Part II.A.
133. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 101. The exception may apply where the terms of the
treaty itself provided that the existence of a "state of necessity" serves
to automatically terminate the treaty.
134. See id.
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Treaties. 135
2.

Impossibility of Performance of the Treaty

Hungary's second argument relied on article 61 of the Law of
Treaties which allows a party to a treaty to invoke the "impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the
execution of the treaty." 136 Hungary argued that it was impossible
to construct a system of locks on its territory knowing it would
cause irreparable environmental damage. Moreover, by May
1992, the essential purpose of the 1977 Treaty - a joint investment and operation consistent with environmental protection had permanently disappeared, and, therefore, it was impossible
to perform the 1977 Treaty. 137 In Hungary's view, the "object indispensable to the execution of the treaty" did not have to be a
physical object, but could be a "legal situation which was the
138
raison d'8tre of the rights and obligations."
The ICJ found that the intention of the drafters of article 61
of the Law of Treaties was to exclude such situations as a ground
for termination or suspension of a treaty. 139 Even if the phrase
"object indispensable to the execution of the treaty" did encompass legal regimes, however, Hungary failed to show that the legal regime had permanently disappeared given that the 1977
Treaty contained provisions for the parties to negotiate and
make amendments as needed.14° The judges further added that if
the legal regime could indeed be considered as having permanently disappeared, this was because Hungary'had originally
failed to carry out its obligations under the 1977 Treaty and
therefore, under article 61(2) of the Law of Treaties, Hungary
was precluded from invoking the impossibility of performance

135. See id. para. 99 (citing Law of Treaties, supra note 73, arts. 6062).
136. Law of Treaties, supra note 73, art. 61, § 1.
137. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 94.
138. Id.
139. Id. para. 102.
140. Id. para. 103.
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justification.1 41
3.

Occurrence of a Fundamental Change of Circumstances

Hungary's third argument relied on article 62 of the Law of
Treaties which provides that:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the
treaty unless:
A. the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by
the treaty; and
B. the effect of the change is radically to transform the
extent of obligations still to be performed under the
treaty.142
Hungary contended that, in addition to political and economic
changes in Hungary and Slovakia since the 1977 Treaty came
into force, the 1977 Treaty had been transformed from a treaty
consistent with environmental protection to a "prescription for
environmental disaster." 43 These fundamental changes,144it urged,
served as a ground for termination of the 1977 Treaty.
The ICJ found that the political and economic changes were
not sufficiently linked to. the primary purpose of the 1977 Treaty
a joint investment for the production of energy - as to constitute an essential basis of the consent of the parties. Moreover,
any environmental dangers which may have occurred were not
completely unforeseen, and therefore could not constitute a
1 45
"fundamental change of circumstances."

141. Id. Article 61(2) of the Law of Treaties provides that
"[i]mpossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a
ground for terminating ... a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a
breach by that party ... of an obligation under the treaty .... " Law
of Treaties, supra note 73, art. 61, § 2.
142. Law of Treaties, supra note 73, art. 62, § 1.
143. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.C.J. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 95.
144. Id. para. 92.
145. Id. para. 104.
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4. Material Breach of the Treaty by Slovakia
Hungary invoked article 60 of the Law of Treaties to support
its contention that Slovakia's breach of the 1977 Treaty entitled
Hungary to terminate the 1977 Treaty. 46 Article 60 of the Law of
Treaties provides that "[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by
one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a
ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in
whole or in part." 47 The ICJ found that Slovakia's violation of
the 1977 Treaty did not occur until October of 1992, when it
48
proceeded to operate the works constructed under Variant C.
Therefore, Hungary's notification of termination in May of 1992
preceded any violation by Slovakia of the 1977 Treaty, thereby
precluding Hungary from using Slovakia's material breach as
1 49
grounds for a legal termination of the 1977 Treaty.
5.

The Development of New Norms of International
Environmental Law
Hungary's last contention was that the emergence of new international requirements for the protection of the environment
precluded performance of the 1977 Treaty. 50 The ICJ noted that
neither of the parties contended that new peremptory norms of
environmental law had emerged subsequent to the adoption of
the 1977 Treaty, and therefore declined to address the scope of
51
article 64 of the Law of Treaties.'

146. See id. para. 96.
147. Law of Treaties, supra note 73, art. 60, § 1.
148. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra
note 3, para. 108.
149. See id. para. 109.
150. See id. para. 97.
151. See id. para. 112 (citing Law of Treaties, supra note 73, art. 64
("If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any

existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and
terminates.")). Significantly, the ICJ noted that the parties could have
jointly incorporated "newly developed norms of environmental law"
into the 1977 Treaty, thereby hardening the soft law principles. Id.; see
discussion infra Part III.A; see also ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 55 (Supp. 1994) ("The number of
treaties and other international instruments reproducing the same legal norms concerning the environment continues to grow . . . .The
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In sum, the ICJ found that Hungary's notification of termination of the 1977 Treaty was at best premature, and did not have
the effect of terminating the 1977 Treaty under international law.
III.

PROTECTION OF THE DANUBE RIVER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

Environmental policy decisions made by governments, international organizations, and international tribunals today directly affect the quality of human life tomorrow. 15 2 As the ICJ itself
noted, "the environment is not an abstraction but represents the
living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn."' 53
The case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project was the
first international dispute brought before the ICJ in which environmental issues were "so fully pleaded and considered."' 5 4 It
was also brought at a time of growing international concern for
the environment.'5 5 As such, the ICJ was presented with the op-

work of the International Law Commission shows that the repetition of
the same norms in numerous international instruments can be considered as giving birth to new customary rules.").
152. In the decision, the ICJ judges themselves stressed the importance of being "mindful that, in the field of environmental protection,
vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment . . . ." GabcikovoNagymaros Project (I.CJ. Sept. 25, 1997), supra note 3, para. 140.
153. I.CJ., Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 241 (July 8).
154. I.C.J. Communiqu6, Sept. 19, 1997, supra note 6; see supra
note 6 (highlighting prior international environmental disputes which
have been settled or adjudicated by other tribunals).
155. In the last several decades, numerous international agreements and conventions have been signed out of recognition of the
grave danger facing the environment. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818; Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development: Principles on General Rights and Obligations, U.N. GAOR
Preparatory Comm., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
PC/WG.III/L.33/Rev.1 (1992); Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,
Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.190/4, 28 I.L.M. 649; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, i985, 26 I.L.M.
1516; The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
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portunity to set a new standard for environmental protection in
the next century, putting the spirit of countless international environmental agreements and conventions into effect. It explicitly
declined to do so.
Certainly, the ICJ faced the difficult task of weighing the rights
of parties vis-i-vis the environment under circumstances where
the likelihood and extent of environmental harm remain unknown. Significantly, no tribunal or international agreement has
ever addressed the rights of states with respect to possible future
environmental harm. The paucity of rules or principles that address unrealized harm is untenable in light of the distended temporal gap between act and effect that characterizes environmental malfeasance.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of imposing liability for future
harm, there are alternative mechanisms that may serve the interests of the environment, particularly in the case of the Danube
River. The first is the resort to "soft law." The second is the establishment of an ongoing institution that has quasi-judicial, investigative, surveillance and coordination authorities with respect
to activities affecting the Danube River.
A.

The Use of "Soft Law" in Protecting the Danube River

"Hard law" entails the accrued rules and principles, derived
largely from treaties and custom, by which states may assert their
rights in transboundary disputes.1 56 Not coincidentally, however,
treaties are generally worded in vague and general terms, while
customary law principles require a great deal of time and repeated state practice before they are recognized as legally en57
forceable rules.
In contrast, "soft law," articulated in the form of political statements or values, "is increasingly used precisely because it is so
politically convenient." 158 The importance and value of soft law

Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, 11
I.L.M. 1416.
156. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 269 (1992).
157. See id.
158. Id.
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lies in the fact that it promotes international comity and cooperation, and can serve to secure an agreement that would otherwise not be achieved.15 9 Any resulting agreement can also serve
as a foundation for a harder-edged agreement later. 60 In essence, "[s]oft law is where international law and international
161
politics combine to build new norms."
The "soft law" approach is especially appropriate to the Danube basin in light of the region's lingering economic and political instability in the wake of the Soviet Union's retreat from Eastern Europe at the turn of the decade. 62 These political changes
were accompanied by dramatic shifts in the perception of the
Danube River by the governments of riparian states. Prior to
1989, the Danube River was viewed as a resource to be exploited
for navigation, energy production, irrigation, and industrial uses.
More recently, however, many riparian states have come to view
the Danube River as a valuable resource essential for the maintenance of ecosystems, and have focused their attention on the sustainable use of the Danube River commensurate with their eco63
nomic development.
The rise in nationalism, as well as the rise in transboundary
disputes over the Danube River, makes cooperation in the form
of international agreements or treaties unlikely 64 On the other
hand, the aspirations of many of these now, in varying degrees,
democratic states to become a part of the European Union is

159. Id.
160. Id. The Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer is a good example. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol: Helsinki Declaration of Participating States, May 2, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1335. The consensus reached at
Helsinki was helpful in ensuring "that the London meeting in 1990
could agree on hard amendments to the Montreal Protocol." Palmer,
supra note 156, at 269-70.
161. Palmer, supra note 156, at 269.
162. See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 8, at 538.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 526-33 regarding current conflicts and issues surrounding the Danube River, including the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute. The authors state that while conflicts over the use of the Danube
River have existed throughout its history, transboundary disputes have
become particularly more pressing since 1989. See id. at 526.
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conducive to the active use of "soft law," and to the development
of a cooperative regime for promoting environmentally sustainable development in the Danube River region.1 65 While the riparian and non-riparian states with an interest in the use of the
Danube River may not be able to agree on hard rules and principles in the form of a treaty, they may at least be able to jointly
articulate the need for cooperation in protecting the Danube
River and its surrounding wetlands. Such statements and shared
values can become the basis for future hard-edged multilateral
agreements.
B.

The Development of an InternationalCommission for the Danube
River

The environmental degradation facing the Danube River basin
makes it imperative that, in addition to, or apart from, the use of
"soft law" to achieve political consensus, an international commission be established to regulate all activities on and/or affecting the Danube River and its surrounding wetlands. There have,
in fact, been several commissions for the Danube River in the
past.1 66 However, these commissions, including the current Danube Commission, 167 have focused on the regulation of navigation

165. See id. at 522.
166. See Teclaff, Fiat or Custom, supra note 78, at 55-56.
167. The current Danube Commission was established by the Belgrade Convention, supra note 14, arts. 5-19, 33 U.N.T.S. at 199-205. It is
the only commission currently operating on the Danube River, is composed of only the riparian states, and is "a mere organ of coordination." Teclaff, Fiat or Custom, supra note 78, at 56.
The main task of the [current] Danube Commission is to assure navigable conditions on the river. This includes, inter
alia preparing a regional plan for river projects; the dissemination of all construction and project proposals by the riparian countries to the other member countries for comment;
the creation of a unified system for marking the channel; the
harmonization of regulations; the publication of a Hydrology
Bulletin; and, the collection of relevant statistics. The Commission has no sovereign powers, and its decisions take the
form of recommendations to the governments of its
members.
Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 8, at 526 n.11.
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on the Danube River, and not on environmental protection of
68
the Danube River.
The experience of the United States and Canada in dealing
with transboundary water pollution suggests that the use of an
ongoing international commission regulating the Danube River
would be clearly beneficial. 169 Differences concerning pollution,
diversion, water levels, and the utilization of the water resources
of the Great Lakes, in particular, led the United States and Canada to establish the International Joint Commission in 1909.170
This permanent binational commission consists of six commissioners - three from each country - who were intended to act,
and- have in fact successfully acted, "as a single impartial body,
171
rather than as two instructed national delegations."
The International Joint Commission serves four primary functions in protecting the Great Lakes.1 72 First, it performs "quasijudicial functions," approving applications from governments,
public agencies, private corporations and individuals for the construction or operation of dams and other works that could affect
the natural level or flow of the Great Lakes. 173 Second, it performs "investigative and recommendation functions" by providing examinations and recommendations with respect to the
rights or interests of either the United States or Canada in the

168. See Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 8, at 526; see also
Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The GabcThovo-Nagymaros Dispute
and InternationalFreshwater Law, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 290, 313-22
(1996) (discussing the various mechanisms that have regulated activities
on the Danube River). The Belgrade Convention would apply insofar
as eutrophication, for example, affects the signatory states' obligation
to maintain the "navigable condition" of the Danube. Belgrade Convention, supra note 14, art. 3, 33 U.N.T.S. at 199; see supra note 30. The
importance of maintaining the navigability of the Gabcikovo sector is
articulated in an annex to the Convention. See Belgrade Convention,
supra note 14, Annex II, 33 U.N.T.S. at 219.
169. See Richard B. Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the
International Law of the Environment, 144 Rec. des Cours 139, 167-79
(1975-I), reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1202, 1208-11 (1995).
170. See id. at 1208.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1208-09.
173. See id. at 1208.
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Great Lakes. 17 4 Although the International Joint Commission's
recommendations are only advisory, the governments of the
United States and Canada have made extensive use of this device. 175 Third, it performs "surveillance and coordination functions" by monitoring compliance with their recommendations,
and monitoring and coordinating other actions or programs
when requested by the two governments.1 76 Fourth, it performs a
"judicial function," serving as an agency to which parties can re1 77
fer disputes for binding decisions.
The success of the International Joint Commission is rooted in
several factors, all of which suggest that a similar commission
could be successfully established with respect to the Danube
River. First, the International Joint Commission is structured as
an independent agency of technical experts, rather than as a
group of government agents serving in a representative capacity. 78 This structure not only relieves the United States and Canadian governments from incurring the cost of maintaining a large
permanent staff,17 9 but also increases the credibility of the International Joint Commission as an institution.1 80 Second, the ongoing investigation, monitoring and dispute-resolution functions
performed by the commission promote efficient environmental
dispute avoidance, management, and resolution.1 81 Third, its

174. See id. at 1209.
175. See id. The two governments are likely to follow the recommendations of the International Joint Commission out of recognition
of their joint interest in maintaining the environment of the Great
Lakes.
176. See id.; see also Greg Block, Independent Review of the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), SB79 A.L.I.-A.BA.

291, 326 (1997) (discussing the coordination and advisory roles which
the International Joint Commission has assumed with respect to boundary water issues between Canada and the United States).
177. See Bilder, supra note 169, at 1209.
178. See id. at 1211; see also Daniel K. DeWitt, Great Words Needed for
the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1901, 69

IND. L. J. 299, 313 (stating that the International Joint Commission's
success is rooted to some degree in its relative obscurity, and having
limited its function to scientific and technical investigations).
179. See Bilder, supra note 169, at 1211.
180. See id. at, 1210.
181. See id.
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function as a central coordinating institution also allows it to
monitor all activities and to minimize any cumulative negative effects on the environment more efficiently than would an ad hoc
commission established for each proposed activity or upon the
occurrence of a dispute.
Finally, the Commission has also proven to be effective at dispute resolution. Most of the complex technical issues and politically sensitive problems underlying the environmental disputes
have been dealt with by the International Joint Commission
rather than by ad hoc tribunals, or the ICJ.'8 2 The benefit of the
International Joint Commission serving a judicial function is that
"[it] take [s] account of a multiplicity of factors, [is] founded on
the necessity for compromise and a balancing of interests, and
permit[s] the Governments to retain control over the most significant decisions and policy.""8 3
The environmental dangers facing the Danube River make it
important, if not imperative, that an ongoing international commission be established for monitoring and regulating activities
which not only do, but also could, affect the ecology of the Danube River and its surrounding wetlands. The establishment of an
international commission would allow riparian and non-riparian
states to cooperate out of a joint interest in maintaining the ecology of the Danube River for future use. Given the political and
economic tensions facing these states, they are more likely to cooperate through a multinational impartial commission than
through an agency composed of national representatives. More
importantly, a commission regulating the Danube River would be
able to monitor the cumulative negative environmental effects
on the Danube River and its flora and fauna.1 14 As an ongoing
impartial commission, the commission would have the scientific
expertise, the knowledge of other activities affecting the Danube
River, and the credibility needed to protect one of the world's

182. See id.
183. Id.
184. "[T]he absence of effelctive measures to abate water pollution
was and remains hampered by the lack of a basin-wide authority that
can promote multilateral, integrated policies to control the pollution
entering the river from the multiple . . .sources." Linnerooth-Bayer &
Murcott, supra note 8, at 537.
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unique aquatic ecosystems."8 5
There are currently two proposals under consideration for de1 6
veloping an international commission for the Danube River. 1
The first is to expand the current Danube Commission beyond
the regulation of navigation to include the mandate of promoting sustainable development.18 7 The second is the establishment
of a new commission, possibly with a close link to the European
Union.8 8 A third possibility - creating a separate commission in
addition to the current Danube Commission - is disfavored inasmuch as such fragmentation defeats the ostensible value of a
commission: undertaking integrated policies that seek to balance
the interests of economic development with protection of the
Danube River.189
There are several drawbacks to expanding the current Danube
Commission to incorporate protection of the environment within
its mandate. First, and most importantly, it lacks the credibility
required of a successful multinational institution.1 90 It has been
regarded by many states as "a highly-politicized and ineffectual
hangover from the Communist era."1 91 Second, membership in
the Danube Commission is limited.1 92 Under consideration are
proposals to expand membership to all countries of the Black
Sea, to all riparian states, or to all states with an interest in the
Danube River basin.1 93 Regardless of which option is chosen, expanding membership in the current Danube Commission will require an amendment to the Belgrade Convention, which currently precludes new parties.1 94
185. See id.
at 524-25.
186. See id.
at 538-45.
187. See id.
at 538.
188. See id.
189. See id.
at 539.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Currently, the Danube Commission consists of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, and
Ukraine. In addition, Croatia, Germany and Moldova have observer status. See id.
at 539.
193. See id.
at 540.
194. By its terms, the Belgrade Convention is limited to states situated on any bank of the Danube's navigable portion. See Belgrade Con-
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The current Danube Commission's lack of credibility suggests
that the establishment of a new commission would better serve
the ecology of the Danube River in the long term. A new commission could be structured in a fashion similar to the International Joint Commission: an independent and impartial agency
of scientists and technical experts, not acting in the capacity of
national delegates, that monitors and regulates all activities
which could affect the Danube River, and settles disputes relating to such activities. Through joint cooperation and a shared interest in protecting one of Europe's great international rivers,
the riparian and non-riparian states of Europe have the opportunity to realize economic development with minimal sacrifice to
the environment.
CONCLUSION

In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute between Hungary and
Slovakia, the fifteen judges of the ICJ faced the difficult task of
balancing the rights of the parties under treaty law against the
ever-growing need to protect the environment. Their difficulties
were compounded by the fact that long-term environmental
damage resulting from the Project may not become evident for
years in the future, by which point it may be irreversible. Insofar
as the ICJ was unable or unwilling to impose liability on Slovakia
for harm which has not yet materialized, the court has seriously
compromised its own power to advance international environmental law.
Although the ICJ was limited in the extent to which it could
protect the environment, there are alternative non-judicial means
by which the Danube River, and other international water resources can be better protected for future generations. Recognition among states of a joint interest in protecting the environment can foster cooperation through the use of "soft law" and
the development of multinational independent agencies. In the
case of the Danube River, a commission of scientists and environmentalists, similar to the International Joint Commission,
which has successfully protected the transboundary water re-

vention, supra note 14, arts. 2, 44, 33 U.N.T.S. at 199, 217; see also Linnerooth-Bayer & Murcott, supra note 8, at 539.
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sources of Canada and the United States for nearly 90 years, is
advisable. The successful establishment and operation of a new
Danube Commission, like the International Joint Commission,
will serve as a precedent for other states, and will help to develop the still nascent principles of customary international environmental law.

